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Introduction. 
 
 
 
This article develops arguments, found in chapter six of Freedom is Power: Liberty Through 
Political Representation,i concerning how Hamilton's account of freedom might inform our thinking 
about global justice. Hamilton’s work grapples with the problem of domination and freedom in a 
post-Apartheid and post-colonial world order. The persistence of domination in a ‘liberated’ world 
is a vital theme that has to become more central in international political theory. While we find 
important statements of this theme in some of the canonical texts of the tradition Hamilton’s 
treatment of the theme hints at a further reaching, more demanding engagement with ‘real modern 
freedom’- freedom in the vast shadow of economic, political and cultural domination. This 
contribution seeks to place his work within debates in normative international political theory and to 
compare his position (and its implications) with those arguing for normative and institutional 
change in world politics. Chapter six is the least developed element of the book. This is no criticism 
– its focus on freedom is primarily and properly centred on domestic political life. Nevertheless, the 
argument in chapter six that our representatives can and should control the global economy hints at 
a potentially radical position on global economic justice. This paper argues that a radical position on 
global economic justice is essential to any account of justice in the modern world and pushes 
Hamilton's argument to consider the framework of 'real global freedom'.  This article explores 
where Hamilton's position places him in relation to existing scholarship on questions of distributive 
justice and global economic governance and points in the direction of renewed insistence on real 
freedom as a basis for international justice. 
 
Part 1 
 Chapter six (‘Can and ought our political representatives control the economy?’) claims that our 
representatives, under the right conditions (Hamilton 2014:190), can and ought to control the global 
economy (emphasis added). This claim is the logical progression of the theory of ‘Freedom is 
Power' developed in the rest of the book. However, we are not really told what these right 
conditions might be – or what representation and hence institutional legitimacy at the international 
level might look like. In this paper I want to explore what Hamilton's theory of freedom might mean 
for a developed theory of global justice. I do this by exploring the primary implications of the 
theory of ‘Freedom is Power’ for international governance and policy and trying to think about how 
‘Freedom is Power’ is or is not compatible with some of the major ideas in contemporary 
international justice debates with a view to getting a clearer sense of where ‘Freedom is Power’ 
might sit and where it might innovate. There are two elements to this. The first is a consideration of 
the ideal institutional structures that may enable real freedom and the second is a consideration of 
agency or who will push to create these institutional conditions. The latter is the most challenging 
because, as scholars like Thomas Pogge have explained, the entrenched privilege of the developed, 
liberal capitalist states operates at the very foundations of the post war economic and legal order 
(see below). In the final section I reflect on the history of the New International Economic Order 
movement in search of insight on this issue. 
 
To drive my arguments forward I will draw on the two key arguments that push ‘Freedom is Power’ 
to the international and on the four domains of ‘real modern freedom’ (empowerment, 
representation, resistance and control) that structure ‘Freedom is Power’ to orient my reading of 
Hamilton's claims concerning international justice (Hamilton 2014:Chapter four). My work here is 
not intended to critically engage with the conceptualisation of freedom in itself. Rather it is intended 
as a thought experiment to see where ‘Freedom is Power’ might take us. I am not arguing that this is 
where ‘Freedom is Power’ necessarily takes us – that these are the only options. There are a range 
of more-or-less radical options available (although anyone who values the status quo will find them 
all radical).  
 
 Hamilton claims that the right climate for achieving international justice includes political will, 
ideology and institutional configuration. I think that the political will to create a world in which 
resistance to domination and control is the basis for the freedom of all is to be found in nascent but 
stunted form in some existing normative and institutional developments. Stunted because the job of 
overcoming the entrenched domination of the most powerful national economies, major 
multinational corporations and hyper-consumer capitalism more broadly is such an overwhelmingly 
big task that most of these normative frameworks have become compromised in the process of 
institutionalisation. Nevertheless, I think there are some foundations that we might build on – even 
if they need reform. I also think that ‘Freedom is Power’ is compatible with a number of ideological 
positions. Hamilton's construction of ‘Freedom is Power’ draws on a broad range of theoretical 
positions and ‘Freedom is Power’ itself appears to be able to enjoy a weak overlapping consensus 
from these sources. It is clear from the text, I think, that we are not waiting on the emergence of a 
single, universal ideological position that could drive institutional and normative reform. Elements 
of liberal cosmopolitanism, solidarism, pluralism, socialism and republicanism all demand reform 
of the international order and are compatible with an idea of international law as the protector of 
group and individual rights. Similarly, the nascent idea of heterarchically rather than hierarchically 
ordered international law we find in ‘Freedom is Power’ insists on a place for groups that are 
usually marginalised in the international institutional-legal order. This has the potential to offer a 
powerful counter to the discrimination and domination that I think is present in some arguments 
about international constitutionalism and itself seeks to challenge the image of international law as a 
mere epiphenomenon of power. The question of institutional configuration will be the main vehicle 
through which I explore these issues. In examining institutions, both in terms of concrete 
institutions like the United Nations Security Council and in terms of fundamental institutions such 
as multilateralism, sovereignty or international law,ii we get a sense of the normative and practical 
agenda that ‘Freedom is Power’ sets us in global affairs. 
 
There are two major foundations to the claim that we need major reforms to the international order 
if we are to have a regime that can underwrite freedom for all. First freedom relies on control over 
economic organisation and policy formation. The influence of international structure in shoring up 
the hegemonic domination of key groups of political and economic actors and the influence of these 
actors on the attainment of 'real modern freedom' clearly points for the need for empowerment, 
representation, control and resistance as elements of freedom.  
 
[T]he degree to which I am in fact free under modern conditions…depends on the extent to 
which I live in conditions of domination in a number of causally related domains. My 
freedom depends on my power within four related domains: (a) my power to overcome 
existing obstacles; (b) my power to determine who governs my political association or 
community; (c) my power to resist the disciplining power of my community and state; (d) 
and my power to determine my social and economic environment via meaningful control 
over my representatives. (Hamilton 2014:95)  
 
Thinking about real modern freedom at the global level requires some imagination as this statement 
is developed to apply predominantly in the domestic context. It is the second foundation of 
Hamilton’s argument that begins to point the way. This second plank of the argument has even more 
radical potential but can be at least partially addressed through a renewed focus on some existing 
normative frameworks. The second foundation of Hamilton's argument draws on the degradation of 
the planetary environment and the unsustainably high levels of affluence and consumption that are 
current marker of success and freedom. The current 'success' of the developed global north in this 
regard entrenches domination and the aspiration of the impoverished global south to achieve equal 
measures of affluence threaten our shared environment to the point where self -preservation and 
freedom appear to be at odds with one another. The need both for self-control with regard to 
consumption and the need to exert control on economic and environmental policy both to counter 
domination and to give effective expression to this self-control grounds the argument here 
(Hamilton 2014:122). Exploring these claims points to a number of key reforms to existing 
international institutions. Three contemporary sites of global political contestation that have been 
explored by normative international political theory offer interesting proving grounds for ‘Freedom 
is Power’. A classic cosmopolitan argument that framed later debates both by offering a description 
of the essentials of moral cosmopolitanism that has become the industry standard by laying out a 
clear challenge to post war economic consensus is our first port of call.iii  Here I want to look at 
where ‘Freedom is Power’ sits in relation to arguments about the dispersal of sovereignty (and 
hence effective representation) and at distributive justice as a means of resistance and compensation 
for the continued existence of unjust institutions. I then briefly examine and argument made by 
Robert Keohane and Allen Buchanan who, in exploring the normative necessity of UNSC reform – 
particularly in the context of humanitarian military intervention, imagine institutions that, I suggest, 
might give effective expression to the ideal of representation that ‘Freedom is Power’ requires on 
the international plane.iv Thirdly I want to look at republican and solidarist accounts of power-
countering – looking at ways of bringing economic actors under the global compact, increasing the 
representative effectiveness of NGO's and coalition building between weaker states.v Finally I look 
at sustainable development and at the residue of the New International Economic Order model 
found in Common Heritage regimes in the global commons. In all of these areas significant 
institutional and policy reforms are implied by ‘Freedom is Power’. In examining in brief these key 
sites of debate in global justice the structure of my exposition – following, appropriately given 
Hamilton’s republican sympathies, a recent paper by Cecile Laborde and Miriam Ronzoni on 
republican internationalism and globalismvi  – sacrifices depth of analysis for a glimpse of the sheer 
range of implications of ‘Freedom is Power’. 
 
 Hamilton's argument brings us to focus on '(a) the extent to which existing institutions enable the 
free determination and satisfaction of needs; and (b) the political institutions that may be necessary 
for the empowerment of citizens in these processes' (Hamilton 2014:83). This leads to a critical 
analysis of existing international institutions. The targets themselves – the G7, the UNSC, 
Multinational Corporations etc. - are not unusual targets for critique but the substance of ‘Freedom 
is Power’ structures the critique in a distinctive way and pushes our approach to reforming 
transnational institutional structures in a particular direction. A couple of features are worth noting 
before I explore possible ‘Freedom is Power’ based arguments about international institutional 
reform and legitimacy. I should note here that the first requirement – that representatives, who do 
control macroeconomic policy and the trajectory of our globalised economies (p.175) should be 
embedded in domestic structures that ensure that they do so in freedom enhancing ways – is not my 
focus. The question of a legitimate and just global order does depend on domestic political 
legitimacy and international political legitimacy. If the argument in ‘Freedom is Power’ is to work 
the four domains of freedom (empowerment, representation, resistance and control) have to be 
realised in both contexts. Here I focus only on the implications of the argument in the international 
context. The second broad background note concerns Hamilton's general view of economics. He 
writes 
 
 In contrast to both of these extremes, 'planned economy' or 'free market' the thesis...defended 
 here maintains that ever more complex and inter-dependent economies require many of the 
 existing mechanisms of the capitalist economy – freedom of production, occupation, 
 employment movement, exchange and pricing – in order not only to continue to function 
 minimally but also to be freedom enhancing in the sense of satisfying needs and enabling the 
 assessment and alleviation of situations of domination. (Hamilton 2014:178) 
 
The form of this broadly capitalist economy is to be 'controlled' rather than 'planned' or 'free'. 
Control here means subjecting macroeconomic policy to the control of representative of groups (as 
they emerge in legitimate and free states) structured not by the existence of a single administrative 
agent (which equates control with planned economies in Hayek) but  
 
 the creation of political institutions and forms of representation that enable special, unequal 
 and even partisan forms of political participation and representation in order to enable those 
 with little or no access to power due to little social and economic power the means to affect 
 political decision making and counter the domination of the social and economic elites. 
 (Hamilton 2014:179) 
 
This clearly sets an agenda for critique of existing institutions and can suggest (in ideal theory) 
radical institutional reforms and (in non-ideal theory) policy preferences in existing debates in 
economic and environmental politics. The notion of partisan politics is also important to the third 
background note. The key to resisting the domination of one group over others is  
 
 to avoid seeking 'some 'ephemeral' common good or 'public interest' [and] to remain realistic 
 about continued group conflict and moral and political disagreement in society, and to 
 entrench institutions that provide partisan political power to those groups that have little 
 social and economic power. (Hamilton 2014:18) 
 
This rules out the sorts of institutional cosmopolitanism that equate a strong account of moral 
egalitarianism with world government, or liberal cosmopolitanisms that seek neutrality or equality 
in institutional forms without having a place for the recognition of entrenched inequality. It also 
speaks to the notion of power-countering that we find in Pettit's republican theory of international 
organisation (Pettit 2010). 
  
 
The State, International Organisation and Representation 
 
The central problem that much normative international political theory grapples with is the place of 
the state as the key actor in international affairs. It concentrates the power of domestically 
hegemonic groups and pulls moral focus away from individuals. In a world of well ordered (in the 
‘Freedom is Power’ sense) states this is not such a problem as the representatives of groups are 
readily identifiable and able either to articulate their right to be represented beyond the state or to 
hold whatever diplomatic corps, multinational business representative, or NGO's arise to account 
domestically. But what does ‘Freedom is Power’ imply for the structure of international society? It 
is clear from the text that the existing status quo privileges the power of the advanced capitalist 
states of the global north. Their power is entrenched in the institutional structure of the global 
economic order – in the power of the WTO or the G7 for example and in the existence of the Veto 
power of the five permanent members of the UNSC. ‘Freedom is Power’ tells us that the state-based 
nature of the order privileges the elites of these powerful states at the expense of groups within 
those states as well groups and nations in the global south. This recognition is not, of course, unique 
to ‘Freedom is Power’. Liberal critiques of the international order point to the privilege accorded to 
powerful states through victory in war and through colonial occupations. Thomas Pogge, in an 
essay pointing to the contradictions of the current international legal order, revisits a common theme 
from his work that reflects many of Hamilton’s concerns. 
 
Various human rights are widely recognised in codified and customary international law. 
These human rights promise all human beings protection against specific severe harms that 
might be inflicted on them domestically or by foreigners. Yet, international law also 
establishes and maintains institutional structures that greatly contribute to violations of these 
same human rights: central components of international law systematically obstruct the 
aspirations of poor populations for democratic self-government, civil rights and minimal 
economic sufficiency. And central international organizations, like the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, are 
designed in ways that systematically contribute to the persistence of severe poverty. (Pogge 
2012: 373) vii 
 
 He goes so far as to describe the diplomatic architects of the WTO as 'hunger's willing 
executioners'  - a description he realises will not gain much sympathy or be taken seriously in the 
global North. In response to such patent injustice he argues for a fundamental shift away from the 
state-centric monopoly of power and a system of distributive justice to compensate for the costs of 
injustice. Here I think it might be instructive to think about how ‘Freedom is Power’ and, in 
particular, the key idea of the aesthetic theory of representation (Hamilton 2014:145-153), might 
push us to consider what Pogge calls the vertical distribution of sovereignty. Pogge's moral platform 
is of course distinct form ‘Freedom is Power’. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the subtle ways in 
which Pogge lays out is position to include needs, interests, individuals and groups. He famously 
writes, 
 
 From the standpoint of cosmopolitan morality – which centres on the fundamental needs and 
 interests of individual human beings, and of all human beings – [the] concentration of 
 sovereignty is no longer defensible....The proposal is that governmental authority - or 
 sovereignty – be widely dispersed in the vertical dimension. What we need is centralisation 
 and decentralisation, a kind of second order decentralisation away from the now dominant 
 level of the state. Thus persons should be citizens of, and govern themselves through a 
 number of political units of various sizes without any one political unit being dominant and 
 thus occupying the traditional role of the state. And their political allegiances and loyalties 
 should be widely dispersed over these units: neighborhood, town, county, province, state, 
 region and world at large. People should be at home in all of them without converging on 
 one as the lodestar of their political identity. (Pogge 1992:58) 
 
I think one key criticism from an ‘Freedom is Power’ point of view would be that the units Pogge 
identifies on the vertical axis do not correspond with group representation and group freedom in a 
way that accurately identifies what are mobile or flexible sites of domination. The identification of 
interests and identities as the basis of representation (rather than regional or geographical units from 
neighborhood to globe) would be a start – allowing representation as identification to enable 
NGO's, representatives of gender, class, form of employment etc. to the fore (Hamilton 2014:143). 
Most crucially however, is the recognition that representation cannot 'track' pre-existing interests. It 
has to be fluid enough to avoid a 'tyranny of the representatives' (Hamilton2014: 148) to ensure that 
groups whose needs are not represented – or groups whose needs and interests change over time- 
can be empowered through representation and resist the establishment of hegemonic notions of the 
people and their proper representatives. If the need for a move away from a unitary conception of 
sovereignty is necessary we need then a vertical and horizontal dispersal – needs, identities and 
interests are constituted at all levels and must be open to be contested over time. Contestation is 
both part of the renewal of legitimacy and a motivation for change in representation. We might 
think of this as the dispersal of representation rather than sovereignty – an answer to what Pettit 
refers to as the problems of membership (where the needs of certain groups are excluded because 
they are not represented by a state – or even by a city or neighbourhood) and of what Pettit (2010) 
calls the imbalance problem (where less powerful groups are accorded a special status in order to 
resist the more powerful or exert control in the ‘Freedom is Power’ sense). A 10 year plebiscite on 
the direction of the global economy (Hamilton references this potential domestic framework in 
chapter 6) – contestation at the global level - seems too unrealistic and institutionally complex so 
how might we realize this sort of freedom on the international plane? 
 
I struggle to imagine a global order that might embody these ideas in a complete way (a failure I am 
sure of my imagination rather than the thesis itself) but if we think of how we might a) mitigate the 
power of states in international organisations and b) encourage the partisan and unequal power of 
groups directly affected by those International Organizations some interesting options come to 
mind. One draws on work by Buchanan and Keohane who, in reviewing the legitimacy of the 
UNSC point to the illegitimacy of the P5 veto and the more general problems of UNSC decision 
making. They argue for an ideal of the removal of the veto and the establishment of ex-ante and ex-
post accountability mechanisms – especially when the UNSC is considering cases under chapterVII 
of the charter which deals with threats to international peace and security (Buchanan and Keohane 
2004). The accountability mechanisms are to consider evidence and to ensure that states want to act 
– or have acted – in good faith or for reasons compatible with humanitarian principles and apply 
sanctions where that is not the case. I can imagine an argument that puts membership of groups who 
can claim to be affected by particular decisions on these mechanisms – regional and other interest 
groups (such as Non-Governmental Organizations dealing with violence against women, child 
soldiers, farmers whose livelihoods are at peril, environmental groups etc). I can imagine a forum in 
which debate over which groups are affected and thus appointed, and that considers the validity of 
humanitarianism itself, or the constitution of the force to be used etc. As a skeleton model it 
suggests similar fora at the WTO, G7, Human Rights Bodies and treaty negotiations. All of this on 
the assumption that the immediate demolition of the architecture of the world order, even if required 
in theory, would not be a realistic option. Buchanan and Keohane are sceptical, because of the 
constitution of the UN Charter which requires the acquiescence of the Permanent 5 to any charter 
amendment, that any such reform can be enacted and envisage and new institution of ‘rights 
respecting states’ that would act outside of the UN. A position that developed Hamilton’s thesis here 
would have strong reason to reject this move. Such a position would go further than Chris Reus-
Smit’s rejection of the potential hierarchisation of world politics that such a move implies (one that 
mimics or entrenches the European standard of civilisation that characterised the colonial 
domination of the nineteenth century).viii As well as having a commitment to what Reus-Smit calls 
an equalitarian regime Hamilton’s thesis would supply strong reasons, grounded in his theory of 
partisan representation, to construct accountability mechanisms and to entrust them with the power 
balancing role. 
 
This brief sketch shows both how radical ‘Freedom is Power’ may be on the international plane and 
how representation might sit alongside existing mechanisms in a fairly straightforward way. The 
driver of change is the radical message about freedom and representation and the requirement that 
groups find a voice, and a real possibility for resistance, in global institutions. In one sense it is like 
an expanded and deepened argument for including NGO's in decision making and treaty 
negotiation. The mechanism (rather than a global plebiscite) could be the accountability 
mechanisms linked to a forum (similar in status to the now defunct trusteeship council) that 
negotiates, validates and appoints group representatives to these mechanisms. Like Buchanan and 
Keohane I realise that practical steps to removal of the veto and the establishment of new 
accountability mechanisms are hampered by the charter requirements that give P5 members an 
effective veto over institutional change. Nevertheless this serves as an example of what it might 
take to resist the stranglehold of the most powerful on the world stage. Pogge's rider to his theory is 
a conception of distributive justice (funded perhaps by a Global Resources Dividend) to be paid in 
compensation for the continued existence of unjust institutions and I think that something like this 
is also implied by ‘Freedom is Power’. Once again, however, the conception of distributive justice 
generated by ‘Freedom is Power’ is likely to be nuanced in at least two specific ways again driven 
by the domination of global north over global south economically (and of large multinationals over 
the world’s poorest) and the environmental issues that Hamilton places at the centre of his 
international political economy. 
 The resulting position put me in mind of arguments for a New International Economic Order. The 
1970's project may well be dead but the issues that inspired the debates are clearly still very present. 
Add to this the environmental risks associated with levelling the world up to the consumption levels 
of the world’s richest and we are pushed in at least two interesting directions. The first focuses 
again on what Pettit calls the imbalance problem. The most powerful national economies and the 
most powerful multinational corporations clearly enjoy unjustifiable influence on macroeconomic 
policy. Pettit calls for a privileging of the less powerful – formed perhaps by coalition building 
among the weaker states (Pettit 2010:159) (or indeed coalitions of groups). ‘Freedom is Power’ also 
demands policies to enable the resistance of domination of the poor by the rich and a recognition 
that partisan policy in this regard is justified. Again, the question is what potential avenues are there 
for the institutionalisation of these demands? Coalitions (or attempted coalitions) by relatively 
weaker states are not uncommon in the UN and other negotiating fora but history has some lessons 
concerning the effectiveness of those coalitions – even where the core demands of those coalitions 
gained some traction. Two areas where urgent work is required are found in the regulation of 
MNC's and in the global commons.  
 
One initiative that might be of interest is the 'global compact' or the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights developed under the leadership of John Ruggie between 2005 and 
2011. This initiative was an attempt to rekindle the idea (in the work of the sub-committee on the 
promotion and protection of human rights in 2003) that business had to accept legal responsibility 
for their part in promoting, protecting and, in many cases violating, human rights.  Human Rights 
might seem an odd vehicle for the promotion of ‘Freedom is Power’ – the regime often comes under 
accusations of Western bias, State-centricism and the like – but the guiding principles (a 31 
principle, soft law instrument adopted unanimously by Human Rights Council in 2011) directly 
approach the impact on these non-state actors on the lives of the poorest from the oil fields of 
Nigeria to the mines of Peru. Institutionalising the idea of representation noted above in this context 
opens up important discussions about who suffers at the hands of these powerful actors (something 
that would go well beyond just those employed in a globalised supply chain). At the same time it 
attempts to address the duties of states to protect human rights, the duties of companies to respect 
human rights and the routes to remedy that those adversely affected could take. (Ruggie 2013). It 
also opens up a forum for the examination of the global market on human well-being more broadly 
as a much broader range of groups (rather than just labour, capital, state) articulate views on the 
issues. 
 
Finally, I want to think about regulation in the global commons. The global commons are areas 
beyond national jurisdiction that have both commercial and environmental import for humanity as a 
whole. Legal regimes in the deep seabed, outer space, the Antarctic, the atmosphere etc. embody a 
quite extraordinary awareness of the global import of resource exploitation and environmental 
pollution to humanity. The regimes, negotiated in the shadow of the NIEO movement, established 
institutions to protect the common heritage/common interest of humanity, recognising the 
responsibility of the global north to the global south – as a consequence of the responsibility for the 
environment via industrialisation and as a consequence of colonialism. Both of these latter issues 
remain pertinent (and not just in the global commons in my view) but the regimes are being 
challenged and watered down as exploitation of these areas becomes more plausible and as NIEO 
challenges to the neo-liberal order fade into history.ix It is not just the thought that the unowned 
resource pools and sinks are available to be used to the benefit of humanity and to address the 
consequences of colonialism (although that is a strong pull here). Neither is it just the recognition of 
the link between commercial exploitation and environmental well-being that appeals. What appeals 
to me about these regimes as vehicles for the realisation of ‘Freedom is Power’ is 1) the fact that 
negotiations about transition from common heritage regimes to market led regimes are happening 
now and that if we are to preserve or renew the ideas of freedom and distributive justice at the heart 
of these regimes we need to act now and 2) that the framework agreements that create space for 
ongoing analysis of scientific understanding of the areas in question for the purposes of evolving 
policy seem to me to be useful fora for resistance, control, representation and empowerment more 
generally. If we replace NIEO economic arguments with those in ‘Freedom is Power’ (above) we 
reach, I think, a position between neo-liberalism and planned economy – one well placed to 
underpin,perhaps, the next stage of common heritage/interest claims.  
 
That these innovations began under the influence of the NIEO movement brings me to a 
consideration of the agency question – who will champion the radical transition to a more just world 
characterised by real global freedom? The absence of the 'what' of real global freedom is 
accompanied by the absence of the 'who' in Freedom is Power. The implicit assumption is that the 
dominated will or ought to seek real freedom and while the South African context offers some hope 
that this might bear  fruit there are also reasons for scepticim. The early (radical) successes of the 
Non Alligned Movement (NAM) and G-77 coalition of developing nations in the first iteration of 
global commons regimes are remarkable for establishing burden and benefit sharing mechanisms in 
respect of resource pools (like the deep sea bed or the moon and outer-space) and sinks (like the 
atmosphere) that recognise the injustices of colonialism and the consequent economic inequality in 
global treaty. Yet the sheer power of the most technologically developed states (those most able to 
exploit the resources of the commons) have led over time to an extremely limited application of 
these principles in practise. Indeed the 1994 New York Agreement that amended UNCLOS III and 
the Obama Administration's 2015 Entrepreneurship in Space Act are concrete examples of how 
difficult it is, even for a coalition of 77 states, to gain and maintain traction in a search for justice. 
Indeed many scholars of this movement conclude that any justice claim that challenges neo-
liberalism is doomed to fail as developing nations seeks comparative advantages in pursuing a 
liberal economic agenda.x Nevertheless the core argument of Freedom is Power highlights just how 
counterproductive this is in terms of domestic and global freedom. The unfreedoms of the post-war 
world are sustained and replicated by the neo-liberal economic order and this is something made 
sensible to us not just by anti-colonial movements but also by liberals from Pogge to Buchanan. The 
fact that Hamilton's work comes from a scholar situated in the global south is important. Not least 
because it carries the memory of a struggle to overcome the deeply entrenched structures of 
colonialism and Imperialism. It also has a clear message about the persistence of domination in a 
post-colonial world where neo-liberalism cements the divide between rich and poor in economic 
and political terms both globally and locally. But Freedom is Power points in the same direction as 
cosmopolitans (whether liberal, socialist or solidarist) towards the effects of domination by the 
World's richest 1% and the inability of the extant state system to mitigate those effects. When 
Oxfam reported in 2016 that the richest 1%  own as much wealth as the other 99% and that the 
richest 62 individuals owned as much as the poorest half of the global population it was clear that 
while the political and economic effects of inequality were felt more keenly in the developing world 
they were also manifest in the leading economies. The structures of domination – gender, class, 
race, ethnicity, religion – are politically empowered by a social and economic order that might only 
be challenged by the radical changes envisaged. This is not a global south vs global north, 
developed vs developing economies or Imperialist vs colonised battle. It is a call to link the 
struggles of those pursuing global justice – whether through the reform of representative and 
bureaucratic institutions, the evolution of human rights mechanisms or the development of global 
commons regimes – in challenging the obvious shortcoming of the international legal order. 
Cosmopolitans of all stripes have reason to challenge the hegemony of the existing world order and 
it is vital that coalitions are built across traditional state and geographical boundaries and 
institutions are reformed and constructed in ways that disrupt the current contours of power and 
domination. The accounts of global justice that I have outlined above both champion a dispersal of 
soviereignty and a reform of existing institutions precisely to enable this cross-cutting agency and to 
challenge the structures of domination. 
 
Each of these admittedly sketchy vignettes could be elaborated at far more length than I have here. 
And, as noted in the introduction, I am aware I have sacrificed depth for breadth. Nevertheless the 
idea that we might translate the normative imperatives of ‘Freedom is Power’ into accountability 
frameworks holding IO's states and MNC's up to the scrutiny of groups currently excluded from 
power and thus subject to domination and that we might do so to develop common heritage regimes 
that provide site of resistance and  control as well as fora for reflection of the common interest of 
humanity in global economic affairs has, I submit, the potential to begin to elaborate a theory of 
international politics fit for Hamilton's work. As well as supplying a normative framework that 
takes a particular position in the liberal and republican traditions the insight from the experience of 
the struggle for real modern freedom in modern South Africa lends Hamilton’s international theory 
a clarity and urgency that drives well-worn ideas in a new direction. This direction is due greater 
scrutiny. 
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